
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Anticipation, Free-Rider Problem, and Adaptation 
to Trade Union: Re-examining the Curious Case of 
Dissatisﬁ  ed Union Members
IZA DP No. 4806
March 2010
Nattavudh Powdthavee 
Anticipation, Free-Rider Problem, 
and Adaptation to Trade Union: 
Re-examining the Curious Case of 




University of York 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 













Anticipation, Free-Rider Problem, and Adaptation to Trade Union: 
Re-examining the Curious Case of Dissatisfied Union Members 
 
This paper documents evidence that rejects the paradox of dissatisfied union members. 
Using eleven waves of the BHPS, it studies the past, contemporaneous, and future effects of 
union membership on job satisfaction. By separating union “free-riders” from other 
nonmembers in the fixed effects equations, I find significant anticipation effects to unionism 
for prospective members and covered nonmembers of both genders. Workers go on to 
report, on average, a significant net increase in overall job satisfaction at the year 
unionization occurs. Nonetheless, adaptation to unionism is complete within the first few 
years of joining a unionized firm. One hypothesis for this is that workers adapt their reported 
satisfaction over time to support their union bargaining efforts, which would be consistent with 
the explanation given by Freeman and Medoff (1984) of union’s role in fanning the flame of 
discontent to the management during contract negotiations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Perhaps one of the most well-known results in trade union and collective-bargaining literature 
is that from studies which find that union members are generally less satisfied with their jobs 
compared to nonmembers (see, e.g., Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 1979; Clark, 1997; Heywood, 
Siebert, & Wei, 2002; Guest & Conway, 2004; Meng, 1990; Renaud, 2002; Garcia-Serrano, 
2009; Miller, 2008). This finding is deeply counterintuitive: Given that unionism often leads 
to more bargaining power and improved working conditions, one would expect it to lead to 
greater job satisfaction rather than less. 
Freeman  (1978,  1980)  and  Freeman  and  Medoff  (1984)  argue  that  the  negative 
relationship between unionism and job satisfaction is a reflection of the role of unions as a 
“voice” for workers. Unionized workers are, in other words, encouraged by their union to 
express  their  discontent  and  grievances  to  the  management,  thereby  raising  the  level  of 
apparent  job  dissatisfaction  among  union  members  during  contract  negotiations.  This  is 
reflected  in  the  finding  that  union  members  often  express  lower  job  satisfaction  than 
nonmembers but express relatively high satisfaction with their unions (Fiorito, Gallagher, & 
Fukumi, 1988; Jarley, Kuruvilla, & Casteel, 1990). Duncan (1976) and Borjas (1979) propose 
that unionized jobs are inherently unpleasant and that, hence, a union wage effect can be 
viewed as a compensating differential for lowered job satisfaction overall. Moreover, Borjas 
(1979) argues that the impact of unionism on job satisfaction will also depend on the strength 
of the trade union to maintain the “full wage” and non-pecuniary job rewards. An inverse 
relationship  is  therefore  possible  if  there  is  a  significant  discrepancy  between  what  is 
expected  by  union  members  and  what  they  receive  in  actuality.  More  recently,  Bryson, 
Capellari, and Lucifora (2004) hypothesized that the negative relationship between unionism 
and job satisfaction may reflect the role of workers‟ unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., those who   3 
are  intrinsically  unhappy  with  their  jobs  are  more  likely  to  join  the  union  and  involve 
themselves in union activities than those who are not, thus leading to lower job satisfaction 
among union members relative to nonmembers. 
  The above arguments imply one important empirical implication, namely, if we are 
able to control sufficiently for individual and workplace heterogeneity, as well as allowing 
for the selection effect into a unionized job, then it may be possible to estimate a net effect of 
union membership on job satisfaction that is both causal and nonnegative. However, owing to 
data limitations (restricted controls and unrepresentative or small samples), only a handful of 
studies have been able to satisfy a number of the above requirements. The notable examples 
are Bryson et al. (2004), Bender and Sloane (1998), Gordon and Denisi (1995), and Ranaud 
(2002). Using linked employer–employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey (WERS) for the U.K., Bryson et al. (2004) found that unionized workers report, on 
average, significantly lower levels of job satisfaction compared to nonunionized workers. 
However, they found that the well-being gap between the two groups becomes statistically 
insignificant once individual heterogeneity, establishment heterogeneity, and selection effects 
are  controlled  for  in  the  estimation.  Based  on  this  finding,  they  argue  that  unions  are 
successful at securing an attractive wage package for their members only insofar as that it is 
large enough to offset their intrinsic dissatisfaction generated by higher expectations about 
their job. Using the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) data set, Bender and 
Sloane (1998) controlled for the selection into being a union member by using employee 
perceptions of employer attitudes as instruments. Treating union membership as exogenous, 
they were able to show that the correlation between union membership and job satisfaction, 
albeit  negative,  is  not  statistically  significantly  different  from  zero.  Finally,  Gordon  and 
Denisi  (1995)  and  Ranaud  (2002)  found  statistically  insignificant  effects  of  union   4 
membership  on  either  job  satisfaction  or  the  intent  to  quit  once  working  conditions  are 
controlled for. 
  The finding that trade unions do nothing to improve workers‟ job satisfaction is a 
bitter pill to swallow for many prospective union members. Yet it is the conclusion upon 
which many studies have come to agree. This paper, however, proposes that the discussion 
regarding the role of union membership on job satisfaction may be far from over. 
  In this paper, I argue that previous empirical studies have consistently failed to take 
the following information into account when making their analysis on the impact of unionism 
on job satisfaction: (a) levels of workers‟ job satisfaction in the periods before and after 
joining the union, and (b) the status of union coverage of the control group. As a result, 
previous studies, which have mainly been studies of cross-section data sets, have failed to 
consider that 
(1)  the estimated effects of unionism on job satisfaction at cross-sections may not 
only suffer from unobserved heterogeneity – in that unhappy workers are more 
likely to select themselves into a unionized job – but may also be biased owing to 
confounding  time-varying  endogenous  effects.  For  example,  there  may  be 
significant anticipation effects to individuals joining a trade union, e.g., the same 
worker may have been experiencing a decline in job satisfaction for some years 
before she decides to become a union member. It is therefore possible that there 
could be a positive impact on job satisfaction in the first year of joining the union, 
which would not have been picked up before in prior studies; 
(2)  there  may  be  a  significant  free-rider  problem  among  covered  nonmembers 
(workers who are covered by collective-bargaining agreements but are not union 
members) that, if unaccounted for, can lead to an underestimated effect of union 
membership on job satisfaction; and   5 
(3)  there may be significant mean-reversion or adaptation effects to the initial impact 
of union membership on job satisfaction, which could lead to an underestimation 
of the union effect. 
 
Taking  the  above  factors  into  account,  it  may  therefore  be  possible  to  estimate  a  union 
coverage effect that is both positive and statistically significant. Since Richard Freeman‟s 
(1984) caveats against the use of short-run longitudinal data sets to estimate the impact of 
union membership (simply because the associated measurement error bias stemming from the 
fact that workers hardly change their union status in short-run panels is too great), we now 
have  many  rich,  long-run  micro-panel  data  sets,  with  a  reasonably  good  number  of 
observations of those who change their membership status over time, at our disposal. This 
paper uses eleven years (Waves 5–15) of the British Household Panel Surveys (BHPS) to 
study the leads and lags in job satisfaction to having a recognized union at the workplace for 
(i) all workers who went on to be employed at a unionized firm, with this sample split further 
into (ii) prospective union members, and (iii) prospective covered nonmembers.  
  Section II briefly discusses the psychological concepts of anticipation and adaptation, 
as well as the free-rider problem. Data and analytical strategy are outlined in Section III. 
Section IV reports the results. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Concepts 
A.  Anticipation effects 
 
When we think of anticipation, we think of the effect of an event of interest on well-being 
before it actually occurs (Clark, Diener, Georgellis, & Lucas, 2008; Frijters, Johnston, & 
Shields, 2008). In the context of unionism and job satisfaction, one hypothesis may be that   6 
non-union  members  go  through  a  significant  decline  in  their  perceptions  about  work 
conditions over time, which leads them to join or form the trade union in the future. This can 
be captured empirically by looking at the coefficients on a series of lead variables (will form 
the union in the next 12 months, in the next 1-2 years, etc.) in job satisfaction equations. In 
the analysis of anticipation effects to unionism, an individual fixed effect must be introduced 
so that any negative effect of the lead variables will pick up anticipation rather than selection 
(where those who are inherently unhappy with their jobs are also those who are likely to join 
or form the union). Failure to take into account the anticipation effect may bias the union 
effect in the same direction as the usual selection bias. 
 
B. Free-rider problem 
 
Previous empirical studies on the impact of unionism on job satisfaction have often failed to 
distinguish between covered and uncovered nonmembers (usually all nonmembers are used 
as the reference group to union members). This would be acceptable if the decision to remain 
a nonmember at a unionized firm is exogenous, which may not always be the case (Chaison 
& Dhavale, 1992; Booth, 1985; Booth & Bryan, 2001). The results on the benefits of free-
rider  status  (employees  who  are  covered  by  collective-bargaining  agreements  but  not 
members) are mixed. In terms of the estimated wage differentials, Kahn (1980) and Belfield 
and  Heywood  (2001)  showed  that  union  threat  effects  by  covered  nonmembers  have  a 
positive  impact  on  the  nonunion  wages  which  exceeds  that  of  the  average  pay  package 
received by nonmembers in the uncovered sector. Using WERS 1998 data sets, Booth and 
Bryan (2001) found evidence of zero wage premia between union members and covered 
nonmembers  once  union  membership  is  instrumented.  By  contrast,  Budd  and  Na  (2000) 
found for the US, and Hildreth (1999) for the UK, that covered nonmembers do not receive   7 
the  same  wage  premia  as  covered  members.  Nonetheless,  in  a  more  novel  approach  to 
identify the differences between the two groups, Clark (2001) found using the BHPS that a 
dissatisfied union member and a dissatisfied covered nonmember have a statistically the same 
probability to quit. In other words, his results supports the notion that union dissatisfaction is 
real rather than an artifact of institutional structures that make union members more likely to 
express dissatisfaction. However, he also found that a worker with low job satisfaction at a 
“union-recognized” workplace is less likely to quit than an identical worker at a workplace 
where a union is not recognized. In addition to this, Farley and Fiorito (1990) concluded that 
it is the union free-riders rather than non-covered workers who are significantly more likely 
to indicate a preference for pro-union voting intent, which is at odds with “right-to-work” 
advocates‟  view  of  free-riders  as  “principled  conscientious  objectors”.  Given  these 
conflicting  findings,  further  analysis  that  distinguishes  between  union  members,  covered 





When we think of adaptation, we think of the processes that reduce the effects of repeated 
sensory and cognitive stimuli (see, e.g., Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999). In other words, 
adaptation  generally  refers  to  the  decline  in  satisfaction  over  time  after  the  event  has 
occurred.  Empirical  studies  in  this  area  have  found  significant  evidence  of  adaptation  to 
marriage and divorce (Lucas & Clark, 2006; Zimmerman & Easterlin, 2006), income (Di 
Tella, Haisken-DeNew, & MacCulloch, 2005), disability (Oswald & Powdthavee, 2008), and 
unemployment (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2004). With regards to unionism, one 
could hypothesize that union members get „used to‟ improvements in the pay package and 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting here that there is no labor law that restricts workers‟ ability to free-ride in the UK.    8 
work  conditions.  After  a  period  of  satisfaction,  the  psychological  effects  of  union 
membership adapt to a base level and cognitive changes in interests, values and goals set in. 
In this process, workers increase their expectation (or aspiration) level (Stutzer, 2004). 
 
III. Implementing a test 
A.  Empirical implications 
 
Are there anticipation effects to forming a union or a staff association to negotiate wages and 
work conditions with the management? Is there a free-rider problem in the covered sector? 
Do union workers adapt to their new work conditions? A test of these questions has to have a 
number of special features:  
(i)  individuals in the sample must be followed for a reasonably long period, so that 
information on them is available before and after joining a union-covered firm; 
(ii)  there needs to be a control group who does not join a union-covered firm; 
(iii)  A distinction between union members and nonmembers at a unionized firm can be 
made within the data set; 
(iv)  the sample should be representative of the working age population; 
(v)  a set of other job-related variables, particularly on occupation, has to be available 
in the data set, so that confounding influences can be differenced out.  
No study of this type has apparently been published in either economic or industrial relation 
literature.  
 
B.  Data 
   9 
The main data set comes from Waves 5–15 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
The BHPS is a nationally representative longitudinal data of British households, contains 
over 10,000 adult individuals (it interviews every adult member in the sampled households), 
and has been conducted between September and Christmas each year since 1991 (Taylor et 
al., 2002)
2.   
In every wave since Wave 1, individuals were asked to rate how satisfied they are 
with four different aspects of their job: total pay, job security,  satisfaction with work itself, 
and hours of work
3. Each of these criteria was to be given a number from one to seven, with 
one representing “very dissatisfied” and 7 “very satisfied”. Finally, individuals asked about 
their overall job satisfaction: “All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with 
your present job overall using the same 1 - 7 scale?”  
This paper also draws upon two questions regarding trade union status in the BHPS: 
(1) Is there a trade union, or a similar body such as a staff association, recognised by 
your management for negotiating pay or conditions for the people doing your sort of job in 
your workplace? 
(2) Are you a member of this trade union/association? 
Three empirical categories of trade union status are discussed in this paper. The first category 
is  having  a  recognized  trade  union  or  a  staff  association  to  bargain  over  pay  and  work 
conditions at the workplace or „Union Coverage‟, which includes all workers working in 
unionized firms. The other two categories are  broken-down by union  membership status, 
which are „Union Members‟ and „Covered Nonmembers‟. 
                                                 
2 The BHPS wave 1 consists of some 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals drawn from 250 areas of Great 
Britain. Additional sample of 1,500 households in each Scotland and Wales were added to the main sample in 
1999, and in 2001 a sample of 2,000 households was added in Northern Ireland, making the panel suitable for 
UK-wide research (see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps). 
3 Participants were also asked in selected BHPS waves (Waves 1-7) about their level of satisfaction with (i) 
promotion opportunities, (ii) relations with boss, and (iii) the use of initiative in their job, although these are not 
used in this paper‟s analysis.    10 
I consider all working age individuals (aged 16-65) in full-time employment (omitting 
the self-employed) who report a level of overall job satisfaction in any given wave. Among 
those who are in full-time employment, the response rates to the job satisfaction questions are 
very good (= 88%). I also restrict the sample to consist only of those who do not change their 
workplace throughout the panel (this is so to avoid the identification problem of the union 
effect on job satisfaction between job changers and newly unionized workers). In addition to 
this,  because  over  85%  of  workers  in  the  public  sector  are  covered  by  the  trade  union 
compared to 33% of workers in the private sector, there will be significantly less number of 
workers moving in and out of union jobs in the former than in the latter. For this reason, I 
focus in this paper on the dynamic effects of union on job satisfaction for workers in the 
private sector who do not change their jobs during their time in the panel
4. This produces a 
nationally representative  sample  of 23,259  observations (5,446  individuals)  for men  and 
17,926 observations (4,838 individuals) for women. Of those, 9,635 observations for men and 
5,970 observations for women had a trade union, or a similar body such as a staff association, 
in their workplace. Approximately 61% of men and  50% of women in unionized firms are 
members of union or a staff association . The data are unbalanced, in that not every one is 
present in all eleven waves. Because the impacts of union on job satisfaction may be different 
for men and women (see, e.g., Clark, 1997), I conduct all statistical analysi s separately by 
gender. The distribution of responses to the domain-specific job satisfaction questions as well 
as  overall job  satisfaction question is reported in Table   1.  Because the vast majority of 
individuals can be tracked for far shorter periods of  time than the available  eleven BHPS 
waves, I concentrate only up to four years before and three years after   union coverage. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, unlike some job satisfaction surveys which are conducted 
by the respondent‟s employer, the responses to the question on job satisfaction in the BHPS 
                                                 
4 I thank Alan Carruth for this suggestion.   11 
are anonymous and conducted by an independent surveyor (again, see, Taylor et al, 2002). 
What  this  implies  is  that  self-rated  job  satisfaction  scores  should  not  be  influenced  by 
whether or not the respondent‟s employer will find out who „voiced‟ their dissatisfactions. 
 
C.  Analytical Strategy 
 
The first equation will consider the lead and lag effects of union coverage on job satisfaction. 
Here, I follow the method outlined in Frijters et al. (2008) and estimate the following lead 
and lag equation: 
 
4 4, 3 3, 2 2, 1 1,
'
0 0, 1 1, 1 2 2, 3 3, ,
it it it it it
it it it it it i it
JS U U U U
U U U U X u
   
     
       

    
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            (1) 
 
where JS represents job satisfaction. Here,  4 U  represents a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if the individual will be covered by a union in the following 3 to 4 years. The other 
leading U dummies are defined similarly. If there is a lead effect to being covered by a union, 
then we would expect to see the lead coefficients to be zero or negative, and to be more 
negative the closer the periods of union coverage becomes. By contrast, the adaptation effects 
to being covered by a union are captured by three dummies: Union coverage 1-2 years, Union 
coverage 2-3 years, and Union coverage 3 years or more. Union coverage of less than one 
year duration, 0 U , is identified by being covered today but not in the previous interview. 
Coverage of 1-2 years is identified by 12 1, 1 and  0 t t t U U U     . Longer lags are defined 
analogously. If there is no important well-being effect from working at a unionized firm, so 
that  being  covered  by  a  union  does  nothing  to  improve  the  employees‟  job  satisfaction 
immediately, then we would expect 0   to take some negative values. If there is no adaptation   12 
to this union effect, then we would expect the later values of    to have the same negative 
values as 0  . Conversely, if there is a complete adaptation to being covered by collective-
bargaining agreements, then later values of  will be insignificant: being covered by a union 
long enough is the same as not being covered at all. With respect to other parameters, X 
represents a vector of standard controls, which includes dummies for different age groups, 
marital status, number of hours normally worked per week, temporary job status, opportunity 
for promotion, real annual personal income, work size, education level, health, as well as 
social class, occupational, regional and wave dummies (see, e.g., Clark, 1997);  it   is the error 
term. The individual fixed effects, i u , is included in the equation so that we are effectively 
following  the  same  individual  through  different  periods  prior  to  being  employed  at  a 
unionized  firm.  The  descriptive  statistics  for  some  of  the  variables  used  in  this  paper‟s 
analysis are reported in Table A1. 
   To test for the welfare impacts of union coverage on workers with free-rider status, 
i.e.  covered  nonmembers,  Equations  (1)  can  be  rewritten  to  distinguish  between  covered 
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where UM  and UN  are respectively dummies representing covered members and covered 
nonmembers.  By  interacting  between  lead  and  lag  dummies  of  both  union  coverage  and 
union membership, I am able to control for the timing of becoming a member of either a staff 
association or a union as some workers may decide to become a member in their second or 
third year rather than in their first year of their firm becoming union-covered. To interpret the 
coefficients, 3  , for example, represents the well-being impact of having worked in a union-  13 
covered firm for at least three years, whilst the sum 3 3 3       represents the well-being 
impact of being a union member in a union-covered firm for at least three years. In the case 
where  allUM variables  equal  to  zero, 3    on  its  own can be  interpreted as  the  well-being 
impact of remaining a nonmember in a covered firm for at least three years. The number of 
observations of the various lags and leads are presented in Table A2 in the appendix. 
This  set-up  allows  us  to  carry  out  simple  tests  of  whether  the  dynamics  of  job 
satisfaction  differ  significantly  between  covered  members,  covered  nonmembers,  and 
uncovered nonmembers. One hypothesis is that the anticipation effect, if any, will be more 
prominent amongst those who went on to become a covered member in the lead equation, 
compared to covered nonmembers. Moreover, if there is evidence of union free-riding (in that 
there are no significant differences in terms of job satisfaction between union members and 
covered  nonmembers) then  we  would  expect  all  of  the  values  of to  take  some  positive 
numbers,  whilst  all  of  the  sums  of       are  expected  to  be statistically  insignificantly 
different from zero.  
 
IV. Longitudinal results 
A.  Union coverage 
 
Are  workers  in  a  union-covered  firm  more  dissatisfied  with  their  jobs  compared  to 
nonmembers? A first look at the raw data evidence suggests that they are. Figures 1A and 1B 
respectively show the reported levels of overall job satisfaction for men and women working 
in the covered and uncovered sector, as well as the t-statistic from the test of identical means 
between the two. We can see from both figures that, in every wave of the BHPS, workers in 
the uncovered sector report higher scores of overall job satisfaction compared to workers 
employed in the covered sector. Moreover, for eight of the eleven waves for men and nine of   14 
the eleven years for women, the differential is easily significant at the 5% level. This is 
consistent with previous studies that found a negative association between unionism and job 
satisfaction (Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 1979; Clark, 1997). 
Are union workers always more dissatisfied with their jobs compared to nonunion 
workers? To answer this question, Table 2 presents within-person evidence of the dynamics 
of overall job satisfaction, which is measured cardinally, four years before and three years 
after employment at a unionized firm or a firm with a recognized staff association. 
As anticipated, there is indeed a significant lead effect in overall job satisfaction one 
year prior to being covered by either a union or a staff association; the lead coefficient at T−1 
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% mark for both men and women (although the 
drop took place earlier for men, at T−2). Given that individual fixed effects are controlled for 
in the regressions, the observed drop in the level of job satisfaction one year prior to being 
covered is independent from the negative selection effect – i.e., people who are inherently 
unhappy with their jobs are more likely to become union members in the future than those 
who are not unhappy (see, e.g., Bender & Sloane, 1998; Bryson et al., 2004). In other words, 
what this result implies is that, for this particular sample of male and female workers, instead 
of quitting their jobs following a significant drop in their job satisfaction, they would go on to 
form either a union or a staff association to negotiate for better pay and working conditions in 
the following year. It may also be the case that organizers of a prospective union or staff 
association encourage workers to voice their dissatisfaction at period T−1, which would in 
turn act as a justification for the formation of either a union or staff association at T. This 
explanation is consistent with that proposed by Freeman and Medoff (1984), although the 
difference in  the present  case is  that, instead of an existing union  fanning the flames of 
discontent for bargaining purposes, organizers of a prospective union or staff association may   15 
encourage  workers  to  express  their  discontentment  and  grievances  early,  before  either 
organization is formed.    
What is the contemporaneous effect of union coverage on overall job satisfaction? 
Conditioning for individual fixed effects and personal and workplace characteristics, we can 
see that the net effects from not being covered by either a union or a staff association to being 
covered,  i.e.,  between  T−1  and  T,  for  genders  are  positive,  sizeable,  and  statistically 
significant  at the 1% level. The  estimated net  union coverage effects (the coefficient  for 
union coverage during year 0–1 minus the coefficient for union coverage within the next 
year) for men and women are 0.124 [S.E. = 0.041] and 0.201 [S.E. = 0.051], respectively. The 
results contrast with the popular finding of a negative relationship between union and job 
satisfaction. They are also inconsistent with the existing theory that workers are encouraged 
upon becoming union members by their union to voice their dissatisfactions about their job 
and working environment to the management (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Instead, the results 
seem to support one of the more intuitive ideas about the role of trade unions, namely, that 
trade unions are there to improve the well-being of those associated with them. Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that, despite the positive net union coverage effect being observed at T for 
both male and female workers, job satisfaction remains, on average, either the same as, in the 
case of men, or significantly below, in the case of women, that of workers who reported to be 
in the uncovered sector throughout the sampling period. 
This improvement in well-being, however, does not seem to last very long; within the 
first two years of being covered by collective-bargaining agreements, there is a complete 
mean-reversion or adaptation effect. Put simply, it takes only two years of being covered by 
either a union or a staff association for workers to become just as dissatisfied about their jobs 
as they used to be one year before the unionization occurred. One psychological explanation 
for  this  is  that  workers  increase  their  expectation  (or  aspiration)  level  very  soon  after   16 
unionization  has  occurred.  Another  plausible  explanation,  which  is  more  strategic  than 
psychological, is that this further drop in workers‟ job satisfaction is not “real” and that the 
heightening of the level of discontent is there only to support their union‟s bargaining efforts 
(Fiorito et al., 1988).
5 Workers, in other words, adapt their reported satisfaction over time to 
support their union in its bargaining endeavors.
6 
Table 3 examines the dynamic effects of union coverage  on satisfaction with total 
pay, satisfaction with job security, satisfaction with work itself, and satisfaction with hours 
worked. Looking across the columns of the table, we can see that the net union coverage 
effect is both positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in two out of four 
domain-specific job satisfaction equations for men, and in three out of four for women. Th e 
largest of these effects is observed in the satisfaction -with-pay regressions: A move from 
union or staff association coverage within the next year to being covered by collective -
bargaining agreements is associated with a 0.16 -point increase in satisfaction with pay for 
men and a 0.22 -point increase for women. Given that income is controlled for in the 
satisfaction equations, we can naturally interpret these net union coverage effects upon 
workers‟  satisfaction  with  pay  as  non-pecuniary.  There  is  evidence,  in  other  words,  that 
workers become significantly happier in the first year of unionization about their expected 
payments in the future. It is also worth noting that these positive net union coverage effects 
are often preceded by one or two years of significant drops in workers‟ satisfaction levels, 
either  with  their  pay,  job  security,  or  even  with  work  itself,  beyond  what  is  normally 
experienced by those who remained in nonunionized firms throughout the panel. Workers 
then go on to report a significant drop in the level of satisfaction with both job security and 
work itself in the second year of being covered by a union or a staff association. However, 
                                                 
5 It is also possible to follow workers before and after the de-unionization of their firm. Though not shown here, 
there is a significant improvement in workers‟ job satisfaction following de-unionization. Workers, in other 
words, become statistically significantly happier with their jobs after the de-unionization has occurred. 
6 It is possible that there could be further adaptation to unionism beyond T+3. However, since there are only a 
few hundred observations of these individuals in the sampled data, we can only speculate about the trend.    17 
perhaps rather unexpectedly, there appears to be zero adaptation to the positive net union 
coverage  effect  on  the  satisfaction-with-pay  equation  for  both  male  and  female  workers. 
What this implies is that the effect of being covered by collective-bargaining agreements 
upon satisfaction with pay never ceases to be positive even after four or more years spent at a 
unionized firm, i.e., all else being equal, the individual would have remained significantly 
dissatisfied with his or her pay if unionization did not take place at T. 
 
B.  Union members versus union “free-riders” 
 
Table 4 goes on to estimate Equation (2) in order to examine whether the results obtained in 
Table 2 vary significantly by union membership status. The two questions of interest are 
whether 1) the negative anticipation effect upon overall job satisfaction found in the previous 
section is primarily driven by prospective union members rather than prospective union free-
riders (or covered nonmembers) and 2) there are any clear psychological benefits to union 
free-riding, i.e., the post-union impact on job satisfaction is statistically the same between 
union members and nonmembers in unionized firms. For simplicity, only the coefficients for 
those who have either been a union member or remained a nonmember since the first year of 
working for a union-covered firm are reported. 
  Table 4 presents a set of results that might have been difficult to predict. First, while 
there is a noticeable drop in the level of overall job satisfaction among male members one 
year before unionization occurs at T, the lead effect to being covered by collective-bargaining 
agreements  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero  for  male  free-riders.  A  similar  pattern 
between  members  and  free-riders  is  obtained,  on  the  other  hand,  for  the  female  sample. 
Second, there appears to be some statistical evidence of a positive net union coverage effect 
among free-riders in the first year of unionization, which is more robust for women than for   18 
men.  Third,  there  is  strong  adaptation  to  the  positive  union  coverage  effect  following 
unionization  for  both  members  and  free-riders  of  both  genders.  Finally,  while  there  is 
evidence of free-riding  generating positive satisfaction, it does  not  seem  to  generate any 
significant differences in overall job satisfaction over union members in general. 
 
C. Union satisfaction with pay premium 
 
The non-pecuniary impacts of union coverage on satisfaction with pay – or, in other words, 
how secure workers think they will be about their financial status in the future from working 
in a unionized firm – are quantitatively important as well as statistically significant. To get 
some  ideas  about  the  size  of  the  coverage  impacts  on  satisfaction  with  pay,  the  “Union 
Satisfaction with Pay Premium” (or USPP for short) can be calculated using the coefficient 
on pay and the estimated net union coverage effect obtained from the satisfaction with pay 
regression equations. Given that our pay variable is in a log form, the USPP equation can be 











          (3) 
 
where USPP refers to the additional income required to compensate an average nonmember 
before unionization occurs at T-1 to be just as satisfied with their total pay as an average 
worker  who  are  covered  by  collective-bargaining  agreements  at  T,  Y  is  the  current  real 
personal income,  year   1 - 0 for  union    represents the coefficient of being covered by a union or a 
staff association for 0-1 year,  year next    in the union with   is the reference coefficient for the lead effect   19 
to becoming union-covered within the next year, and  pay lg  is the estimated coefficient on log 
of real personal income.  
To  illustrate  how  USPP  can  be  calculated  for  the  first  year  of  being  covered  by 
collective-bargaining  agreements,  the  estimated  net  union  coverage  effects  (
year next    in the union with year   1 - 0 for  union     ) are given by 0.159 (S.E. = 0.047) for men and 0.221 (S.E. = 
0.059) for women. Although not reported in the tables, the estimated coefficients on log of 
real personal income are 0.107 (S.E. = 0.024) for men and 0.064 (S.E. = 0.025) for women, 
respectively. Based on current average real earnings of £18k (or $29
7) per annum for male 
nonmembers  and  £11k  (or  $18k)  per  annum  for  female  nonmembers ,  the  USPP  are 
approximately £61k ($98k) and £82k ($131k) for men and  for women. In other words, an 
average male worker in the uncovered sector at  T-1 would require an additional pay worth 
three times their current earning to feel indifferent about their wages as an average male 
worker in the covered sector at T. An average female worker in the uncovered sector at T-1, 
on the other hand, would require an additional pay worth up to seven times their current 
earning to be just as satisfied about their pay as an average female worker in the covered 
sector at T. Nonetheless, given that income is potentially endogenous in the satisfaction with 






                                                 
7 Exchange rate: £1=$1.44 in March, 2009. 
8 Other USPP values and coefficients of other variables in the satisfaction with pay equation can be supplied on 
request.   20 
This paper utilizes data from the British Household Panel Survey (Waves 5–15) to study the 
relationship between job satisfaction and past, contemporaneous, and future union status. The 
main conclusions of this paper‟s findings can be set out as follows: 
 
A)  Anticipation  (from  T−4  to  T−1).  There  is  evidence  to  suggest  that,  on  average, 
workers select themselves into a unionized firm at T based on how unhappy they have 
become with their jobs in the periods before T. This finding is consistent with the 
view  that  a  worker‟s  decision  on  whether  or  not  to  join  a  unionized  firm  is 
endogenously determined (see, e.g., Hildreth, 1999; Budd & Na, 2000). 
B)  Net union coverage effect (at T). In contrast to the popular findings of zero or even 
negative effects of union coverage on job satisfaction, this paper finds a positive and 
significant improvement in workers‟ job satisfaction in the first year of unionization, 
an improvement that is statistically robust in both male and female samples. Free-
riding also generates positive satisfaction, which seems consistent with studies that 
find beneficial effects from free-riding on wages (Booth, 1985; Chaison & Dhavale, 
1992; Booth & Bryan, 2004). The impact of union coverage on satisfaction with pay 
is large, as indicated by the calculated USPP, and is larger for women than for men. 
C)  Adaptation (from T+1 to T+3). Evidence on adaptation to working in the covered 
sector is mixed. In terms of overall job satisfaction, there is evidence of a complete 
adaptation to the initial increase in job satisfaction within one year of working at a 
unionized firm for both men and women. There is, however, little adaptation to the 
initial  increase  in  satisfaction  with  pay  following  unionization.  An  alternative 
explanation to the evidence of a continuing decline in satisfaction in the years that 
follow unionization is that workers may be adapting their reported satisfaction over   21 
time  to  support  their  union‟s  bargaining  efforts,  an  explanation  that  would  be 
consistent with that given by Freeman and Medoff (1984). 
 
These results are important for several reasons. First, the evidence of significant anticipation 
effects to unionism implies that, in addition to the usual unobserved heterogeneity, there are 
also  unobservable  time-varying  differences  between  prospective  union  workers  (both 
members and nonmembers) and other “permanent” nonmembers in the uncovered sector that 
correlate  with  the  job  satisfaction  of  individuals  in  these  two  groups.  Both  types  of 
endogeneity will therefore have to be taken into account if one wishes to estimate the causal 
effects of unionism on job satisfaction. Second, because of the potential free-rider problem, it 
is important to make clear distinctions between union members, covered nonmembers, and 
other  nonmembers  when  constructing  a  union  membership  variable.  Third,  because  of 
adaptation to unionism, it seems pertinent for future studies to control also for the number of 
years that individuals have been members of the trade union. 
  The fourth consequence of these results is purely descriptive or positive. The evidence 
of a positive and statistically significant coverage effect on all workers at T suggests that 
there may in fact be no paradox at all to unionism. In other words, the workers‟ decision to 
form a union or a staff association to negotiate their pay and working environment on their 
behalf is rational in the sense that they do indeed gain more satisfaction from their jobs in the 
first year of unionization. However, as the evidence of this paper clearly suggests, we would 
also need to take into consideration the adaptation effects to unionism if we want to build a 
more realistic and accurate economics model of trade unions. 
  The results of this study also give rise to many important, normative questions. For 
example, how should unions prevent the subsequent decline in their members‟ overall job 
satisfaction over time? Is the decline in satisfaction actually real? Should any actions be taken   22 
on union free-riders if they clearly benefit – not just financially but also psychologically – 
from working in a union-covered firm? 
I  began  by  noting  the  famous  paradox  of  dissatisfied  union  members. The  above 
results  seem  to  point  toward  a  reverse  conclusion  –  that  there  is  indeed  a  statistically 
significant psychological benefit to becoming a union member, at least in the first year of 
union membership. Whether this boost in job satisfaction following unionization is real or 
not, however, remains to be seen.   23 
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Figure 1: Union coverage and job satisfaction in the UK 
Fig 1a: Men 
 
Fig 1b: Women 
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Table 1: Job Satisfaction, Pooled BHPS, Waves 5-15 (Percentages %) 





worked  Overall 
Not satisfied at all  3.58  2.98  1.69  2.47  1.57 
2  5.24  3.33  2.80  3.71  3.17 
3  14.07  7.72  6.53  11.44  7.53 
Not 
satisfied/dissatisfied  9.27  10.01  9.09  12.68  9.69 
5  26.36  19.96  21.85  23.43  24.65 
6  34.12  36.97  42.67  35.51  43.61 
Completely satisfied  7.36  19.04  15.36  10.75  9.78 





worked  Overall 
Not satisfied at all  4.00  2.50  1.76  1.51  1.67 
2  4.92  2.39  2.73  2.51  2.62 
3  13.41  5.72  6.13  9.27  5.92 
Not 
satisfied/dissatisfied  7.04  7.26  6.82  7.74  6.41 
5  24.08  17.35  20.42  21.03  20.75 
6  35.86  38.98  42.83  38.35  46.80 
Completely satisfied  10.68  25.81  19.30  19.57  15.83 
 
Note: The figures represent proportion, so that the top left-hand number, for example, means 
that 3.58% of the men sample reported not being satisfied at all with their total pay. 
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Table 2: Fixed effects job satisfaction regressions: 
Leads to and lags of union coverage 
 
Dependent variable: Overall job 
satisfaction  Men  Women 
      
Union coverage 4 years hence  0.069  -0.037 
  [0.080]  [0.091] 
Union coverage 3 years hence  0.121  -0.085 
  [0.066]+  [0.080] 
Union coverage 2 years hence  -0.074  -0.045 
  [0.055]  [0.066] 
Union coverage within the next year  -0.128  -0.347 
  [0.045]**  [0.054]** 
Union coverage 0-1 year  -0.003  -0.146 
  [0.038]  [0.048]** 
Union coverage 1-2 years  -0.090  -0.210 
  [0.045]*  [0.057]** 
Union coverage 2-3 years  -0.080  -0.215 
  [0.051]  [0.066]** 
Union coverage 3 years or more  -0.200  -0.274 
  [0.045]**  [0.058]** 
     
[Coeff.] Union coverage 0-1 year – [Coeff.] 
Union coverage within the next year =  0.124  0.201 
  [0.041]**  [0.051]** 
     
Age: 26-35  -0.002  0.031 
  [0.044]  [0.053] 
Age: 36-45  -0.013  -0.002 
  [0.065]  [0.078] 
Age: 46-55  -0.049  -0.035 
  [0.087]  [0.104] 
Age: 56-65  0.008  -0.082 
  [0.110]  [0.132] 
Living with a partner  -0.017  -0.017 
  [0.044]  [0.052] 
Widowed  0.151  -0.175 
  [0.230]  [0.168] 
Separated  0.154  -0.141 
  [0.079]+  [0.082]+ 
Divorced  0.103  0.034 
  [0.089]  [0.086] 
Never married  0.003  -0.114 
  [0.059]  [0.068]+ 
Ln(number of hours normally worked per 
week)  -0.330  -0.175 
  [0.058]**  [0.039]** 
Temporary job  -0.073  -0.149   30 
  [0.052]  [0.062]* 
Promotion opportunity  0.369  0.368 
  [0.021]**  [0.026]** 
Ln(real annual personal income)  -0.045  -0.047 
  [0.021]*  [0.022]* 
Work size: 1-24  0.062  0.009 
  [0.048]  [0.064] 
Work size: 25-199  -0.014  -0.071 
  [0.043]  [0.058] 
Education: completed first degree  0.043  -0.161 
  [0.147]  [0.191] 
Education: completed higher degree  0.319  0.381 
  [0.246]  [0.479] 
Health: poor  0.206  0.000 
  [0.127]  [0.116] 
Health: fair  0.260  0.136 
  [0.125]*  [0.113] 
Health: good  0.395  0.235 
  [0.125]**  [0.113]* 
Health: excellent  0.485  0.329 
  [0.127]**  [0.116]** 
Constant  6.358  6.290 
  [0.329]**  [0.351]** 
Social class dummies (21)  Yes  Yes 
Occupation dummies (372)  Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies (20)  Yes  Yes 
Wave dummies (10)  Yes  Yes 
Observations  23259  17926 
Individuals  5446  4838 
R-squared (within)  0.0576  0.0605 
 
Note: + sig. at 10%, * sig. at 5%, ** sig. at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Reference 
groups: no union at the workplace, married, permanent job, no promotion opportunity, work 
size: 200 and more workers, education: lower than first degree, health: very poor.   
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Figure 2: The dynamic effect of union coverage on job satisfaction 
Fig 2a: Men 
 
Fig 2b: Women 
 
Note: Year T is the year of union coverage. 4-standard-error bands (95% C.I.) are reported: 
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Table 3: Fixed effects regressions for each different aspect of job satisfaction 
3a: Men 











Union coverage 4 years hence  0.033  0.161  -0.076  0.053 
  [0.092]  [0.090]+  [0.080]  [0.086] 
Union coverage 3 years hence  0.002  0.139  0.075  0.119 
  [0.076]  [0.074]+  [0.067]  [0.072]+ 
Union coverage 2 years hence  -0.063  -0.103  -0.109  -0.013 
  [0.063]  [0.061]+  [0.055]*  [0.059] 
Union coverage within the next year  -0.105  -0.167  -0.099  -0.034 
  [0.052]*  [0.050]**  [0.045]*  [0.049] 
Union coverage 0-1 year  0.054  -0.169  -0.042  0.041 
  [0.044]  [0.043]**  [0.038]  [0.041] 
Union coverage 1-2 years  0.030  -0.166  -0.124  0.062 
  [0.052]  [0.051]**  [0.045]**  [0.049] 
Union coverage 2-3 years  0.002  -0.210  -0.149  0.012 
  [0.059]  [0.058]**  [0.052]**  [0.056] 
Union coverage 3 years or more  -0.074  -0.234  -0.187  -0.047 
  [0.051]  [0.050]**  [0.045]**  [0.048] 
[Coeff.] Union coverage 0-1 year – 
[Coeff.] Union coverage within the 
next year = 
0.159  -0.002  0.056  0.075 
  [0.047]**  [0.046]  [0.041]  [0.044]+ 
 
3b: Women 











Union coverage 4 years hence  -0.082  0.027  -0.025  0.163 
  [0.106]  [0.099]  [0.094]  [0.097]+ 
Union coverage 3 years hence  -0.052  -0.141  -0.079  0.043 
  [0.093]  [0.086]  [0.082]  [0.085] 
Union coverage 2 years hence  -0.066  -0.013  -0.033  -0.015 
  [0.078]  [0.072]  [0.068]  [0.071] 
Union coverage within the next year  -0.187  -0.189  -0.232  -0.066 
  [0.064]**  [0.059]**  [0.056]**  [0.058] 
Union coverage 0-1 year  0.035  -0.087  -0.106  0.018 
  [0.056]  [0.052]+  [0.049]*  [0.051] 
Union coverage 1-2 years  0.010  -0.161  -0.179  -0.025 
  [0.067]  [0.062]**  [0.059]**  [0.061] 
Union coverage 2-3 years  0.058  -0.183  -0.174  -0.069 
  [0.077]  [0.071]**  [0.067]**  [0.070] 
Union coverage 3 years or more  -0.038  -0.193  -0.223  -0.016 
  [0.068]  [0.063]**  [0.060]**  [0.062] 
[Coeff.] Union coverage 0-1 year –  0.221  0.103  0.127  0.083   33 
[Coeff.] Union coverage within the 
next year = 
  [0.059]**  [0.055]+  [0.052]*  [0.054] 
 
Note: + sig. at 10%, * sig. at 5%, ** sig. at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Same 
control variables and number of observations as Table 2.   34 
Table 4: Fixed effects job satisfaction regressions: 
Leads to and lags of union coverage by membership status 
 
Dependent variable: Overall job satisfaction  Men  Women 
Union member, i.e. the sum of       parameters     
Union coverage 4 years hence & become member in the 1
st 
year  -0.194  -0.221 
  [0.156]  [0.177] 
Union coverage 3 years hence & become member in the 1
st 
year  0.009  -0.064 
  [0.119]  [0.154] 
Union coverage 2 years hence & become member in the 1
st 
year  -0.129  -0.015 
   [0.098]  [0.123] 
Union coverage within the next year & become member in 
the 1
st year  -0.243  -0.494 
  [0.077]**  [0.095]*
* 
Union coverage union 0-1 year & member 0-1 year  -0.075  -0.297 
  [0.057]  [0.074]*
* 
Union coverage 1-2 years & member 1-2 years  -0.099  -0.375 
  [0.064]  [0.087]*
* 
Union coverage 2-3 years & member 2-3 years  -0.147  -0.393 
  [0.071]*  [0.098]*
* 
Union coverage 3 years or more & member 3 years or more  -0.312  -0.384 
  [0.059]**  [0.081]*
* 
[Coeff.] Union coverage 0-1 year – [Coeff.] Union 
coverage within the next year =  0.168  0.197 
  [0.074]*  [0.093]* 
Non-member, i.e.  parameter     
Union coverage 4 years hence & remain non-member  0.152  0.013 
  [0.091]+  [0.104] 
Union coverage 3 years hence & remain non-member  0.155  -0.126 
  [0.079]*  [0.094] 
Union coverage 2 years hence & remain non-member  -0.064  -0.017 
  [0.065]  [0.080] 
Union coverage within the next year & remain non-
member  -0.055  -0.260 
  [0.053] 
[0.065]*
* 
Union coverage union 0-1 year & non-member  0.032  -0.064 
  [0.046]  [0.057] 
Union coverage 1-2 years & non-member  -0.137  -0.088 
  [0.062]*  [0.077] 
Union coverage 2-3 years & non-member  -0.078  -0.077   35 
  [0.080]  [0.094] 
Union coverage 3 years or more & non-member  -0.110  -0.310 
  [0.060]+ 
[0.075]*
* 
[Coeff.] Union coverage 0-1 year – [Coeff.] Union 
coverage within the next year =  0.086  0.196 
   [0.052]+  [0.066]*
* 
 
Note: + sig. at 10%, * sig. at 5%, ** sig. at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Same 
control variables and number of observations as Table 2. 
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Table A1: Some Descriptive Statistics, BHPS 1995-2005 
 
 


















































































































































































































(0.43)   37 

























Union coverage 4 years 
hence  234  57  177  202  50  152 
Union coverage 3 years 
hence  374  110  251  290  69  202 
Union coverage 2 years 
hence  633  181  410  486  127  307 
Union coverage within the 





















Union coverage 0-1 year  2,706  1,318  1,198  -  -  - 
Union coverage 1-2 years  1,478  502  108  773  -  - 
Union coverage 2-3 years  950  264  47  50  543  - 
Union coverage 3 years or 
more  3,348  795  79  78  80  2,204 

















Union coverage 0-1 year  1,843  967  687  -  -  - 
Union coverage 1-2 years  957  372  92  390  -  - 
Union coverage 2-3 years  613  213  41  44  258  - 
Union coverage 3 years or 
more  1,873  607  83  59  79  940 
 